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CASE COMMENT
CARVING OUT A SPECIAL WARRANT REQUIREMENT:
Arkansas v. Sanders
INTRODUCTION
There have been many important Supreme Court decisions in
the field of warrantless searches. In Arkansas v. Sanders,' the
Supreme Court held that a warrant is required to search personal
luggage removed from an automobile.2 According to that decision,
the automobile exception' to the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement' does not extend to such luggage. In so holding, the Court
completed a process begun in United States v. Chadwick5 where it
invalidated the warrantless search of a footlocker taken from an
automobile.' In this respect Sanders is certainly an important deci-
sion.
This comment discusses the Sanders decision in light of its
relation to Chadwick and the automobile exception. The purpose is
twofold. First, it will be shown that Sanders is an integral part and an
inevitable result of the Chadwick holding.7 Secondly, it will be
demonstrated that in the Chadwick-Sanders line, the search of per-
sonal luggage has been presented as a separate search and seizure
field with its own exceptions and its own problems distinct from the
automobile exception.'
1. 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
2. Id. at 2594.
3. For discussion of the automobile exception see notes 38-46 infra and ac-
companying text.
4. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
6. See notes 49-59 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text.
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FACTS
On April 23, 1976, Little Rock, Arkansas police set up sur-
veillance at the Municipal Airport, responding to reliable informa-
tion that Lonnie James Sanders would arrive that afternoon carry-
ing a green suitcase containing marijuana.' Sanders arrived as
predicted and after deplaning proceeded through the airport and
placed two bags in the trunk of a taxi. He then proceeded to the
baggage claim area where an accomplice was waiting. Lifting a
green suitcase from the baggage rack, Sanders handed the suitcase
to the accomplice and then quickly left the airport and waited in the
taxi. Shortly thereafter the accomplice also left the airport. He placed
the green suitcase in the trunk of the taxi and joined Sanders in-
side.10
The officers who had been observing the two men followed the
taxi as it left the airport. After driving a few blocks, the officers
radioed to a police patrol car and ordered them to stop the taxi."
Once the taxi was stopped and the suspects ordered out of the car,
the officers requested that the taxi driver open the trunk of the car.
Without asking permission of either Sanders or the accomplice, the
officers immediately opened the green suitcase and found marijuana
hidden inside.12 Sanders and his accomplice were subsequently in-
dicted for possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver.3
Sanders moved to suppress the evidence found by police in the




At trial the court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. A
jury later found Sanders guilty as charged. 5
Sanders appealed the denial of his motion to suppress to the
Arkansas Supreme Court which reversed the trial court decision.9




13. The relevant Arkansas statute reads in part: "[Ilt is unlawful for any per-
sons to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a con-
trolled substance." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2617(a) (1976).
14. The Fourth Amendment is set out at note 4 supra. The relevant portion of
the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
15. 99 S. Ct. at 2589.
16. __ Ark. at __, 559 S.W.2d at 704.
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The court noted that probable cause was apparent from the facts of
the case,1" but there was a total absence of exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless search.' 8 The court further added that as
a container for personal effects, 9 a piece of luggage was not subject
to the same factors which diminish expectation of privacy in an
automobile.' Moreover, the suitcase was no longer mobile once it
was in police control."' Therefore, the suitcase was not subject to a
warrantless search as might be the case with an automobile. 21
In a majority opinion authored by Mr. Justice Powell, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Arkansas decision. 23 The
issue before the Court was whether the Fourth Amendment re-
quired police to obtain a warrant to search luggage in a properly
stopped automobile where no exigent circumstances exist.2' In
answering this question in the affirmative the Court declined the
State's invitation to extend the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement to the warrantless search of luggage found in an
automobile. 25 The reasoning behind this decision was that once the
suitcase was seized, its mobility was no longer effected by the loca-
tion from which it was taken.' Furthermore, luggage found in an
automobile is not necessarily accompanied by any lesser expectation
of privacy than luggage found in other locations. 27
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, con-
curred, maintaining that the holding in United States v. Chadwick"2
required police to obtain a warrant to search luggage.' Chief Justice
17. "The information supplied to the police by the confidential informant is
adequate to support the State's claim that the police had probable cause to believe
that appellant's green suitcase contained a controlled substance when the police con-
fiscated the suitcase and opened it." Id. at __, 559 S.W.2d at 706.
18. "Indeed, there is nothing in this set of circumstances that would lend
credence to an assertion of impracticality in obtaining a search warrant, or support the
State's contention that 'mobility of the object to be searched (the green suitcase)'
justified the warrantless search." Id.
19. See notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text.
20. __ Ark. at - , 559 S.W.2d at 706.
21. Id. at __, 559 S.W.2d at 707.
22. Id.
23. 99 S. Ct. at 2594.
24. Id. at 2588.
25. Id. at 2593-94.
26. Id. at 2593.
27. Id.
28. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). For discussion of the Chadwick holding see notes 49-59
infra and accompanying text.
29. Chadwick held that luggage seized in a public place was not entitled to a
separate warrantless search exception. 433 U.S. at 12-13. Chief Justice Burger viewed
19791
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Burger, however, disagreed that Sanders involved the automobile
exception. Instead, he argued that police had probable cause to
search a specific suitcase and that any connection between the suit-
case and the automobile was "merely coincidental. 30 Mr. Justice
Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist in their dissent criticized the
majority opinion as unclear, and predicted great difficulty for
anyone attempting to apply the decision."
BACKGROUND
The foundation for the Fourth Amendment was first proposed
by James Madison.2 His proposition stood as a response to the writs
of assistance used by the English against the colonists. 3 As a result
of this background, the Supreme Court has strictly adhered to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, holding that searches
of private property must be reasonable and conducted pursuant to
a proper search warrant." As a result it has been well established
that where a search is conducted without the prior approval of a
judge or magistrate, it is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.5 This rule, however, became subject to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' in situations
where fair application of the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment was not possible. 7
One of these situations led to the adoption of an exception for
the search of automobiles in Carroll v. United States." Declaring
that there was an historical distinction between the search of a
house or structure and the search of an automobile, the Court noted
the difficulty of obtaining a warrant for an automobile search where
the Chadwick decision as controlling in Sanders. See note 30 infra and accompanying
text.
30. 99 S. Ct. at 2595.
31. Id
32. Knuckles, Warrantless Automobile Searches: When Are They Constitu-
tionally Permissible?, 65 ILL. B.J. 532 (1977). The Fourth Amendment is quoted at note
4 supra.
33. Writs of assistance were general search warrants which "described no
premises and named no persons to be searched," Knuckles, note 32 supra.
34. 99 S. Ct. at 2590.
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
36. Id. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58 (1967) (plain view); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile ex-
ception).
37. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
38. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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the automobile could be moved from one locality to another.3 9 In
enunciating the Carroll rule, the Court stated that where probable
cause exists as to the presence of contraband within an automobile,
the warrantless search of such an automobile by a law enforcement
officer was valid.'I
The Carroll rule was further expanded by the Court in
Chambers v. Maroney" which upheld the search of an automobile
after it had been seized and brought to the police station."' The ma-
jority argued that warrantless searches were justified only where
probable cause and exigent circumstances were both present.'3 Thus,
where a law officer had probable cause to search an automobile and
that auto had already been seized, the exigent circumstance of
automobile mobility was not present and a search warrant had to be
obtained." To require a warrant in this situation, however, would
have left law officers little choice but to search the automobile im-
mediately on the street under the Carroll rule.'" The practical solu-
tion, then, was to permit warrantless searches of automobiles before
and after being seized by police."
Such a practical solution, however, did not settle a further
automobile exception issue which was slowly developing in the
lower federal courts. This issue centered on the question of whether
containers found within an automobile were also subject to war-
rantless searches under the automobile exception."' The Supreme
Court finally dealt with the issue indirectly in United States v.
Chadwick."
In Chadwick a federal district court had granted a motion to
suppress marijuana which federal agents had found in a locked
39. Id. at 151.
40. Id. at 149. See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception" What It Is
And What It Is Not-A Rationale In Search Of A Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV.
987 (1976).
41. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 51.
44. Id. at 51-52.
45. Id. at 52.
46. Id. The Court further expanded the auto search exception where the auto
was removed to the police station by approving general inventory searches. See South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1974).
48. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
19791
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footlocker.0 The agents had taken possession of the footlocker im-
mediately after it had been placed in the trunk of an auto by defen-
dants, removed it to their office and searched it without a warrant
approximately one hour later.' The Court of Appeals upheld the
District Court decision"' and the Supreme Court affirmed, 2 holding
that a warrant was required for the search of the footlocker.'
One of the major issues addressed by the Court in Chadwick
was the State's contention that where probable cause exists, lug-
gage lawfully seized in a public place should be subject to an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement." The State compared this excep-
tion to the automobile exception and asserted that luggage was
analogous to automobiles for Fourth Amendment purposes." The
majority carefully pointed out that the State was not contending
that the luggage should be searched as part of the automobile excep-
tion since the relationship between the footlocker and the car in this
case was "merely coincidental.""
The Court rejected the State's argument for a separate lug-
gage exception.57 The search of the footlocker was distinguished
from the search of an auto. First, luggage may be mobile in some
circumstances but an automobile is inherently mobile. Second, the
footlocker was not subject to the diminished expectation of privacy
found in an automobile." Therefore, the justifications for a war-
rantless search of an automobile did not extend to the search of a
footlocker. 9
The majority in Chadwick left unanswered the question of the
applicability of this decision to cases where the automobile excep-
49. United States v. Chadwick, 393 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1975).
50. Id. at 767.
51. United States v. Chadwick, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976).
52. 433 U.S. at 16.
53. Id. at 15-16.
54. Id. at 11-12. The government also argued that the warrantless search was
justified based on a search incident to arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969). Since this contention was not made by the State in Sanders it will be excluded
from this discussion. 99 S. Ct. at 2593 n.11.
55. Luggage and automobiles are both "effects" under the Fourth Amendment
and should therefore be subject to the same warrant requirements. 433 U.S. at 12.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Id. at 11-13.
58. Id. Automobiles are subject to diminished expectation of privacy because
they travel public highways and must comply with official registration and inspection
requirements. Id. at 12-13.
59. Id.
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tion was at issue." It was unclear as to whether Chadwick was a
member of the ever-growing prodigy of the Carroll-Chambers line,
or precedent for a new series of cases involving luggage searches.
When two courts of appeal arrived at completely opposite conclu-
sions while asking this question,6' the stage was well set for
Sanders.
THE SANDERS MANDATE
The self-stated purpose of Sanders was to clear up the misunder-
standing in regard to the application of Chadwick to cases of war-
rantless searches of luggage taken from an automobile."2 In doing so
the majority stated that Sanders would fall on either the Carroll-
Chambers or the Chadwick side of "the Fourth Amendment line.63
Having distinguished Chadwick from the automobile search cases,
the question in Sanders became whether the facts presented an
automobile search under the Carroll-Chambers line or a luggage
search under Chadwick.
As it did in Chadwick, the Court took great pains to distinguish
between these two types of searches." An automobile is subject to a
warrantless search because of its inherent mobility and because
"configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute
the reasonable expectation of privacy." 5 The Court found these
considerations inapplicable to the suitcase in Sanders for two
reasons."
First, the suitcase in Sanders was in police custody when it
was searched and therefore was no longer mobile. The Court ad-
mitted that luggage may be as mobile as the auto it rides in, but
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the
search." Second, since a suitcase is a container for personal effects,
60. See Note, Criminal Law-Search and Seizure, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 421, 429
(1978); Note, Criminal Procedure, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81 (1978).
61. Chadwick does not apply where the automobile exception is relied on to
justify the warrantless search of luggage removed from a lawfully stopped automobile.
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977). Absent exigent circumstances,
Chadwick requires that a warrant be obtained to search a suitcase removed from an
automobile. United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1978).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2588.
63. Id. at 2589.
64. Id. at 2592-93.
65. Id. at 2591.
66. Id. at 2592.
67. Id. at 2593.
68. Id.
19791
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one has a greater expectation of privacy in the contents of that suit-
case than in an automobile which is primarily used for transporta-
tion. 9 Moreover, personal effects are not less likely to be placed in a
suitcase carried in an automobile than in a suitcase generally." Con-
sequently, luggage searches and auto searches must be distin-
guished.7
This distinction does not answer the question presented in
Sanders, however. That question, more specifically, is whether the
search of luggage removed from an automobile should also be
distinguished from an auto search. If the exigency of mobility must
be judged immediately prior to the search, it is unclear why the
search of a suitcase in police custody is any less justifiable than the
search of an automobile in police custody."' It is equally unclear why
one has an apparently greater expectation of privacy in an unlocked
suitcase in one's car trunk than one has in the same items contained
in a locked glove compartment."
The Court in Chadwick pointed out an inconsistency in the use
of an exigency based on mobility." Several times the Court has sus-
tained warrantless searches of automobiles which have been taken
into police custody and removed to the station house. 5 There was
little chance in these cases of the vehicle being removed or evidence
contained in it destroyed . 7 Yet, despite this seeming absence of
mobility, the Court allowed the warrantless search.17 Thus, any
distinction between auto and luggage searches based on relative
lack of mobility is only secondary where luggage is concerned.
What remains as the primary distinction, then, is the undiluted
expectation of privacy one has in the contents of a suitcase. This
argument, however, also leaves several unanswered questions. The
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2594.
72. The Court has validated several warrantless auto searches where the
automobile was within police custody. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976) (general inventory search approved); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975)
(seizure of checks from automobile while at police station); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433 (1973) (search of car trunk for weapon while at police station); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (see notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text).
73. This question is presented in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Blackmun and joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 99 S. Ct. at 2596.
74. 433 U.S. at 12.
75. See note 72 supra.
76. 433 U.S. at 12.
77. See note 72 supra.
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most troublesome of these is why one has a greater expectation of
privacy for the contents of a suitcase than in the "container" por-
tions of an automobile.7' This problem was recognized by the Ninth
Circuit. Under Sanders-type reasoning, a law enforcement officer
may search the trunk of a car for a brick of marijuana but he may
not search a suitcase in that trunk without a warrant even though
he has probable cause to believe that the suitcase also contains con-
traband.7 1
Since neither the distinction based on mobility nor that based
on expectation of privacy is without criticism, one wonders why the
majority in Sanders made no effort to rebut these criticisms.
Possibly the majority was hinting that Chadwick was sufficient to
settle the automobile exception issue discussed in Sanders. For in-
stance, it was admitted that Sanders was similar to Chadwick in
several "critical respects."'" Moreover, in his concurring opinion,
Chief Justice Burger further narrowed any distinction between
Chadwick and Sanders by arguing that Sanders presented facts con-
stituting only a luggage search as in Chadwick, rather than an
automobile search.'1 Thus Sanders and Chadwick seem nearly iden-
tical. The facts in both cases present instances of warrantless lug-
gage searches which are not to be related to the auto search excep-
tion. Indeed, what the Sanders majority discusses and decides, Chief
Justice Burger assumes."
The separation between automobile and luggage searches
which was begun in Chadwick was therefore completed in Sanders.
In deciding whether articles of personal luggage may be searched,
the conclusion may be in no way influenced by the fact that the lug-
gage is seized from an automobile.'3 As a consequence, in justifying
a warrantless search of personal luggage, one must depend on an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement other than the automobile ex-
ception.'
78. See note 73 supra.
79. United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1977). See also note
61 supra.
80. In both Sanders and Chadwick containers were removed from the trunk
of a car and searched by law enforcement officers who had probable cause to believe
that the containers held contraband. 99 S. Ct. at 2592 n.9.
81. Id. at 2595.
82. The Chief Justice proposed that a proper auto search case would involve
police who have probable cause to believe that contraband is located somewhere in the
auto but do not know the specific location. He declined to decide whether that type of
fact situation would present a greater case for a warrantless search of the luggage
within the vehicle. Id.
83. Id. at 2593-94 n.13.
84. Id. at 2594.
19791
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The Chadwick-Sanders line thus may be distinguished from
previous decisions regarding the automobile exception. Prior to
Chadwick this exception had been expanded in several cases." The
results of Chadwick-Sanders, however, confine the automobile excep-
tion to a narrow field which excludes the search of personal con-
tainers within an automobile."
Having confined the automobile exception by removing the lug-
gage searches from that exception, the Court has separated the
Chadwick-Sanders line from its past. The "new" rationale is not
meant to curb auto searches per se. Instead, this luggage search ra-
tionale represents a limit to which the Court is apparently not will-
ing to extend its exceptions. In this light it is easier to understand
Chief Justice Burger's assumption in Sanders and the majority deci-
sion that Chadwick was not an auto search case and neither is
Sanders.
What remains to be seen, then, is what effect the Chadwick-
Sanders rationale will have on luggage searches of the future.
Following Sanders, the fact that a piece of luggage is taken from an
auto is not a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless search of
that luggage. The majority in Sanders stated, however, that other
"special exigencies of the situation"'" may suffice. Although it is not
clear specifically which "special exigencies" will be sufficient, it is
clear that generally they will depend on the probable contents of the
luggage and the availability of those contents to the suspect."
Guidelines are more difficult to ascertain since the Sanders ma-
jority described its holding as applying to "personal luggage.""
While the suitcase and footlocker may now be considered personal
luggage, it is unclear what other types of containers may fall into
85. See notes 41-46 and 72 supra and accompanying text.
86. A comparison of the Chadwick-Sanders decisions with decisions concern-
ing searches of persons incident to arrest is also particularly interesting. In United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), for example, the Court upheld the search of a
cigarette package removed from the suspect's pocket during a search incident to his
arrest. The dissent objected to the search of the package stating that, "even were we
to assume, arguendo, that it was reasonable . . . to remove the object . . . in respon-
dent's pocket, clearly there was no justification consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment which would authorize his opening the package and looking inside." Id. at 255-56
(Marshall, J., dissenting). This is the same logic which was adopted by the majority in
Sanders. The Court sustained the seizure of the suitcase in Sanders but overruled the
warrantless search.
87. 99 S. Ct. at 2593 n.11.
88. ld.
89. Id. at 2594.
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this category. ° As a consequence, the absence of a definition for per-
sonal luggage will cause much confusion in the future for courts,
suspects, and law enforcement agencies.9
In expressing its dissatisfaction with the majority's lack of
clarity in defining personal luggage, the dissent offered an intrigu-
ing hypothetical involving a law enforcement officer who has prob-
able cause to believe that contraband is contained in a portable lug-
gage box attached to the roof of an automobile.2 It is probable that
a suspect would have as great an expectation of privacy in the lug-
gage box as in a suitcase since both serve to transport personal
items. However, the luggage box is more mobile than the suitcase
since it is attached to the automobile and is as mobile as the auto
itself. Applying the Sanders logic that mobility must be determined
at the point immediately before the search,93 such mobility would
not be diminished until the luggage box is within police control; that
is, until it is removed from the auto. If this mobility exigency is suf-
ficient to justify a warrantless search, as it has been in the case of
automobiles, the law officer may search the luggage box immediate-
ly while it is attached to the auto. As a repository for personal
items, however, the luggage box should be entitled to the same
Fourth Amendment protection as the suitcase in Sanders. Hence, a
problem is presented as to whether the portable luggage box is
enough "a part" of an automobile to be searched under the
automobile exception or whether it is a piece of "personal luggage"
under the Chadwick-Sanders reasoning9 '
The luggage box may present an extreme situation and other
containers may not be subject to the same problems. Paper bags and
knapsacks, for instance, arguably have just as great an expectation
for privacy of their contents as does a suitcase and are just as easily
taken into police custody. Moreover, other containers such as a gun
case may be searched immediately without a warrant "because their
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance." 5 As the
dissent pointed out, however, the problems of distinguishing be-
tween these containers will be numerous."
90. Id. at 2595-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2595.
92. Id. at 2597.
93. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
94. 99 S. Ct. at 2597 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2593-94 n.13.
96. Id. at 2597 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1979]
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Thus, while the Sanders opinion cannot be distinguished from
Chadwick, it must nevertheless be distinguished from Carroll-
Chambers and other exceptions to the warrant requirement. At this
point luggage searches must be conducted pursuant to a properly
issued warrant subject to certain "special exigencies" which may
justify a search without that warrant. Although the definitions are
still clouded, the future promises more refinement in this new area
of searches and seizures.
CONCLUSION
In Chambers the Court noted the Carroll holding that war-
rantless searches of an auto stopped on the highway were valid.
Therefore, to require a warrant to search an automobile subsequent-
ly removed to the station house would present law officers with lit-
tle choice but to immediately search the auto on the street.7 In the
same respect, Sanders relates to Chadwick. Chadwick had in-
validated the warrantless search of the footlocker after it had been
removed from an auto and taken to the station." The only plausible
distinction in this respect between Chadwick and Sanders is that in
Sanders the automobile was driven a few blocks before it was stop-
ped and the suitcase seized from its trunk. For the Sanders Court,
however, to have viewed this distinction as controlling, thereby
validating the warrantless search of the suitcase based on the
automobile exception, would have left police with the same choice
which concerned the Court in Chambers. That is, police would be en-
couraged to allow an automobile to be driven a short distance in
order to search all items within that auto without a warrant.
To create such "non-choices" would allow law enforcement per-
sonnel to merely dodge Supreme Court decisions. More importantly
it would force law officers to search automobiles while on the street
or suitcases only after chasing down the automobile they are carried
in. The latter might present those officers with situations of un-
foreseeable danger.
Essentially, then, in light of the Chadwick decision the Court
could have decided Sanders in no other way. This is probably the
most practical of all reasons behind the Sanders decision. In theory
one can separate searches of personal luggage seized from
automobiles and the searches of automobiles themselves. In prac-
tice, however, one is hard pressed to draw clear distinctions. The
97. 399 U.S. at 52. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
98. 433 U.S. at 15-16.
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"Fourth Amendment line" used by the Court" appears at times to
be vague and wavering.
In this respect the dissent's criticism that Chadwick-Sanders is
too unclear to apply in practice is justifiable. The criticism that
Chadwick-Sanders only supplies "a special warrant requirement" '10
may also not be as questionable as it seems on its face. The warrant
requirement is the general rule and the valid warrantless searches
are the exceptions, but in these days of new exigencies, the cases
upholding the warrant requirement may truly be the exceptions.
99. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
100. 99 S. Ct. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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